

# Greece: Debt sustainability outlook post the Oct. 26<sup>th</sup> EU Summit

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
# Part I

## Euro area debt crisis


### Fundamental drivers & market pricing

# Greece and the euro area debt crisis

## Fundamental drivers & market pricing




Source: Eurobank EFG, Reuters



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (Sept. 2011)

# Euro area debt crisis

## *Evolution of sovereign credit spreads*



Source: Bloomberg, Eurobank EFG

# Greece: Debt sustainability analysis

## Official sector forecasts (new Vs. old)

		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2030
Real GDP growth (%)	Revised troika baseline (Oct 21, 2011)	-5.5	-2.9	0.5	2.1	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.4	1.5
	IMF 4 <sup>th</sup> review (July 2011)	-3.8	0.6	2.1	2.3	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	n.a.
GDP deflator (%)	Revised troika baseline (Oct 21, 2011)	1.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.8
	IMF 4 <sup>th</sup> review (July 2011)	1.5	0.7	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.8	n.a.
General gvtn primary balance (% of GDP)	Revised troika baseline (Oct 21, 2011)	-2.3	1.4	2.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	3.5
	IMF 4 <sup>th</sup> review (July 2011)	-0.8	1.5	3.5	6.4	7.7	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4	n.a.
Average nominal interest rate on public debt (%)	Revised troika baseline (Oct 21, 2011)	4.5	5.1	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.7	5.1
	IMF 4 <sup>th</sup> review (July 2011)	4.6	4.9	5.0	5.5	5.9	6.1	6.4	6.9	6.7	6.7	n.a.
Gross public debt (% of GDP)	Revised troika baseline (Oct 21, 2011)	162	183	186	184	179	173	168	163	157	152	130
	IMF 4 <sup>th</sup> review (July 2011)	166	172	170	160	146	143	140	138	134	130	n.a.

Source: Eurobank EFG Research based on EC/IMF/ECB revised debt sustainability report (Oct 21, 2011)

# Part II

October 26<sup>th</sup> EU Summit statement

Main Components & assessment

# October 26<sup>th</sup> EU Council statement

## *Main elements*

### **New bailout plan for Greece**

- new EU-IMF programme financing
- enhanced (and voluntary) PSI

### **EFSF leverage**

- insurance scheme to guarantee “first loss” on newly-issued EZ sovereign bonds
- SPV open to potential funding from the IMF as well public & private financial institutions and investors; structure aims to maximize funding arrangements of the EFSF
- leverage effect of each option to vary with specific futures & market conditions, but could be up to 4 or 5 times

### **EU-wide bank recapitalization; state guarantees to improve long-term bank funding**

- required core tier-1 ratio increased to 9%; new capital threshold to be attained by June 30, 2012
- EFSF to be used only as last resort in bank recapitalizations

### **Further fiscal consolidation**

especially, by member states that are currently experiencing tensions in sovereign debt markets e.g. Italy, Spain

### **Tighter economic and fiscal governance in the euro area**

EU deficit and debt rules should be embedded in national legislation, preferably at constitutional level by the end of next year; Commission to get more power in monitoring national budgets; limited Treaty changes likely

# October 26th EU Council statement

## *Risks, key components and operating modalities yet to be clarified*

### New bailout plan for Greece

- exact PSI structure & realized participation rate
- impact on domestic banks & social security funds
- sovereign rating implications

### EFSF leverage

- extent and cost of insurance scheme
- concrete commitments by potential investors to fund proposed SPV
- creditor status of SPV
- continuity of ECB's Securities Markets Programme (SMP)

### EU-wide bank recapitalization, state guarantees to improve long-term bank funding

- type of capital banks should raise to achieve the new capital ratio
- options to ensure that achievement of new capital bar does not impede flow of credit to the real economy
- options for a EU-wide scheme to guarantee long-term bank funding

### Tighter economic and fiscal governance in the euro area

- a new round of time-consuming parliamentary ratification procedures?



# New bailout plan for Greece

## *Main components*

### Total official financing earmarked for Greece until the end of 2014

- up to €100bn in new EFSF/IMF funding
- up to €30bn in euro area Member State contributions for a new voluntary PSI
- some €42bn of *still undisbursed* funds under the existing *Greek Loan Facility*

### An enhanced (and voluntary) PSI scheme

- exact structure still unknown, but should be such that:
  - 50% nominal discount applied on notional Greek debt held by private-sector investors
  - facilitates drop in public debt ratio towards 120%-of-GDP by 2020

### Other components

- credit enhancements to improve quality of collateral used by Greek banks in Eurosystem liquidity operations
- strengthening of monitoring mechanisms to ensure rigorous implementation of reforms programme
- up to €15bn of privatization revenue *in excess* of those already included in the adjustment programme
- July 21<sup>th</sup> Council decisions to apply as regards the improved terms of (existing & new) EZ/EFSF loans

## Breakdown of Greek public debt by type of holder (€bn)

### A. PSI-plus eligible debt

Greek banks	47
Greek pension funds	23
Foreign accounts	137
<b>Total PSI eligible debt</b>	<b>207</b>

### B. Non PSI eligible debt

ECB holdings	55
T-bills	16
Troika loans	65
Other debt (*)	17
<b>Total non PSI eligible debt</b>	<b>153</b>

**Total Greek government debt (A+B)** 360


Source: Greek MoF, IMF, Eurobank EFG Research estimates

(\*) Includes e.g. loans to Greek public enterprises (~€10bn), Titlos (~€5.4bn) etc.

Reportedly, the new PSI-plus scheme will cover the entire universe of privately-held Greek government debt, with a total outstanding amount of ca €206bn and maturities extending up to 2035. As a reminder, the initial PSI scheme involved government paper maturing up to 2020, with the corresponding notional of eligible bonds estimated at ca €150bn.

# Debt sustainability improvement mainly as a result of (i) nominal discounts applied on notional private-held debt & (ii) lower interest rates on EZ/EFSF loans

Evolution of general government interest rate expenditure (ppt.-of-GDP)\*



Source: Eurobank EFG Research forecasts based on new EC/IMF/ECB baseline projections

(\* ) Assumes full investor participation in new PSI deal

# Greece debt sustainability

## Scenario analysis - Evolution of public debt net of PSI collateral (ppt-of-GDP)

### Key Macroeconomic and Fiscal Assumptions Underlying Baseline

(in GDP percent, unless otherwise indicated)

	Actual					Projections						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
<b>Scenario 0 - EC/IMF/ECB baseline (Greece: Debt sustainability analysis; Oct 21, 2011)</b>												
Real GDP growth (in percent)	-3.3	-3.5	-5.5	-2.9	0.5	2.1	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.4
Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent)	1.1	1.7	1.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.7
Primary balance	-10.4	-5.0	-2.3	1.4	2.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Avg. nominal interest rate on debt (in percent)*	4.7	4.2	4.5	5.1	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.7
Spreads above German Bund (10-year)	-	1,175	1,175	1,000	800	495	475	400	345	300	250	250
German bund rate	-	225	275	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350
<b>Public sector debt</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>152</b>
<b>Scenario 1- EC/IMF/ECB baseline, incorporating 50% nominal discount applied on notional debt held by private investors**</b>												
<b>Public sector debt</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>Scenario 1.1- EC/IMF/ECB baseline, incorporating: (i) 50% nominal discount applied on notional debt held by private investors** and (ii) €10bn additional privatization revenue relative to the baseline (~46bn in 2011-2020)</b>												
<b>Public sector debt</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>115</b>
<b>Scenario 2- EC/IMF/ECB baseline, incorporating: (i) 50% nominal discount applied on notional debt held by private investors**; (ii) €15bn additional privatization revenue relative to the baseline (~46bn in 2011-2020) and (iii) 0.5ppt/annum higher inflation after 2012</b>												
<b>Public sector debt</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>107</b>

Source: Eurobank EFG Research forecasts based on new EC/IMF/ECB baseline projections (Oct 2011)

\* Derived as nominal interest expenditure divided by previous period debt stock

\*\* Assumes full investor participation in the new PSI-plus scheme

# Full coverage of the government's borrowing requirement until 2014

*Table: Projected gross borrowing need & financing source in €bn (period 2012-14)*

<b>1. Gross borrowing need (A1+A2+A3+A4+A5)</b>	<b>252.6</b>
A1. General government deficit	34.4
<b>A2. Amortizations (B1+B2+B3)</b>	<b>125.2</b>
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B1. MLT debt held by private-sector creditors & the ECB (b1+b2)	97.1
b1. Residents	34.8
b2. Non-residents	62.3
B2. ST debt (c1+c2)	18.6
c1. Residents	14.9
c2. Non-residents	3.7
B3. Official creditors (d1+d2)	9.5
d1. IMF	9.5
d2. EU	0.0
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A3. Recognition of implicit/contingent liabilities	27.8
A4. Other (bank recap, deposit buffer etc.)	35.2
A5. PSI "sweeteners"	30.0
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<b>2. Gross financing source (C1+C2)</b>	<b>30.6</b>
C1. Privatization receipts	12.0
C2. Market access (e1+e2)	18.6
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e1. MLT debt	0.0
e2. ST debt	18.6
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<b>Financing gap (1.-2.)</b>	<b>222.0</b>
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<b>Available funding from official sources &amp; PSI (C4+C5+C6+C7)</b>	<b>222.0</b>
C4. Official financing already committed from 1 <sup>st</sup> EU/IMF program*	29
C5. EZ contributions to PSI-plus package	30
C6. New official financing (EFSF/IMF)	100
C7. PSI financing	63

Source: Eurobank EFG Research forecasts based on new EC/IMF/ECB baseline scenario (Oct 2011)

(\*) Assumes disbursement of next two EU/IMF loan tranches (€8bn and €5bn) before end-2011

# Full implementation of new bailout plan for Greece (Oct 26 EU Summit) implies significant drop in market borrowing needs after 2014

## Greece - General gvnt borrowing requirement & financing source (EURbn) Cumulative (Period 2015-2020)

	2015-2020
<b>1. Gross borrowing need (A1+A2+A3)</b>	<b>208.2</b>
A1. General gvnt deficit	46.4
A2 Amortizations (b1+b2+b3)	160.9
b1. MLT debt held by private investors & the ECB	102.6
b2. ST debt	37.2
b3. Official creditors (IMF)	21.2
A3 Other	0.9
<b>2. Gross financing source (C1+C2+C3)</b>	<b>171.0</b>
C1. Privatization receipts	43.8
C2. Market access (e1+e2)	37.2
e1. MLT	???
e2. ST	37.2
C3. PSI-plus financing (100% participation)	90
<b>Financing gap (1.-2.) (*)</b>	<b>37.2</b>

Source: Eurobank EFG Research based on new EC/IMF/ECB baseline scenario

(\*) to be risen via e.g. new official funding

# Part III


Greek sovereign crisis

Risk calendar ahead

# Euro area debt crisis - Focus Greece

## Risks calendar

### Greece: Key dates & events in the coming weeks





## Concluding remark

- Taken at face value (and from a pure debt-sustainability standpoint), the new bailout plan for Greece appears to constitute an improvement relative to that announced at the July 21 EU Council
- Yet, a number of important challenges and risks remain with respect to its implementation
- A more throughout assessment of these uncertainties could not be possible at this stage, given that important parts and modalities of the new package still remain unknown
- The deployment of such risks will potentially be a function of, among others:
  - the final structure of the new PSI scheme;
  - its implications for domestic banks and social security funds;
  - the reaction of rating agencies; and
  - the evolution of the domestic economy and sociopolitical environment in the subsequent period

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